Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/317434 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Economics and Management (JBEM) [ISSN:] 2029-4433 [Volume:] 21 [Issue:] 5 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1285-1306
Publisher: 
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Vilnius
Abstract: 
This work aims to shed new light on the relation between institutional performance and firm dynamics. Considering the Italian manufacturing industry and a panel of 3 years, the authors investigate the relation between the time needed by courts to enforce debtors' obligations and the time needed by enterprises to repay their debts. In particular, we test the hypothesis that efficiency in settling mortgage foreclosure and bankruptcy cases can affect the creditors' decision making on judicial disputes. According to our thesis, inordinately long waiting times to enforce credit rights may increase the contractual strength of debtors, further delaying payments. As shown by our results, there is a statistically significant positive relation between the enforcement of debtors' obligations and the adopted payment index, confirming the key role of the judiciary in the dynamics of firms. Indeed, if the time needed to settle bankruptcy cases decreases by 25%, we can expect the payment index to decrease by 1%; while, focusing on foreclosure cases, we can expect the payment index to decrease by 2%. The policy implications of these results are rather compelling. Policy makers could reform foreclosure and bankruptcy procedures to support national economic growth, without additional burden on the public budget.
Subjects: 
manufacture industry
payment dynamics
institutional performance
strategic management
judicial efficiency
insolvency procedures
JEL: 
K12
G33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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