Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31732
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2008,067
Abstract: 
On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price, specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, and form their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. We formally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality and check if seller participants behave in accordance with them. We find that seller participants are satisficers, but fail to be prior-free optimal.
Subjects: 
Satisficing behavior
bounded rationality
triopoly
JEL: 
C92
C72
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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