Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31730
Autoren: 
Faravelli, Marco
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Rainer, Helmut
Datum: 
2009
Reihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009,016
Zusammenfassung: 
We explore experimentally how power asymmetries between partners affect relationship-specific investments. We find that on average players' investments are larger than equilibrium investments. In contrast to social dilemma experiments, in our experiment preferences for social welfare and those for equality call for different actions. Surprisingly, even disadvantaged players care more for social welfare and less for equality. As a result social welfare increases but so does inequality. We then study conditions under which power-advantaged players give up power. Power-sharing can be successful in the experiment, even when it is not in a selfish world.
Schlagwörter: 
Experiments
incomplete contracts
relationship-specific investment
allocation of Power
social preferences
JEL: 
C91
D23
D86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.54 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.