Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31719 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2008,087
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
One may hope to capture the behavioral and emotional effects of downsizing the laborforce in rather abstract settings as an ultimatum game (see Fischer et al. (2008)), or try to explore downsizing in its more natural principalagent scenario with a labor market background. We pursue the latter approach and test experimentally wether downsizing occurs whenever (game) theoretically predicted and whether effort reactions qquestion its profitability. Our main findings are that downsizing seems to happen less often than predicted and that its frequency does not depend on whether, theoretically, its gains are rather large or small. Interestingly, we also find strong evidence that piece-rate offers are used in a suboptimal way.
Schlagwörter: 
Downsizing
experimental economics
principal-agent model
labor
economics
JEL: 
C72
C91
D21
J01
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
577.25 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.