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dc.contributor.authorKirchkamp , Oliveren
dc.contributor.authorReiss, J. Philippen
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:12:45Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:12:45Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31716-
dc.description.abstractWe present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can be well described by Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids, a larger fraction seems to either use constant markdown bids or seems to rationally optimise against a population where some members use markdown bids and some are rational.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2008,066en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAuctionen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordoverbiddingen
dc.subject.keywordunderbiddingen
dc.subject.keywordrisk-aversion.en
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleHeterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidderstheory and experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn583849091en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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