Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31709 
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dc.contributor.authorLevati, Maria Vittoriaen
dc.contributor.authorZultan, Ro'ien
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-28-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:12:03Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:12:03Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31709-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of contributors a player waits before committing to a further contribution. Based on hypothetical distributions of randomly generated contribution sequences, we provide strong evidence for conditionally cooperative behavior. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2009,029en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods gameen
dc.subject.keywordReal-time protocolen
dc.subject.keywordInformation feedbacken
dc.subject.keywordConditional cooperationen
dc.subject.keywordSimulationsen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwSimulationen
dc.titleCycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn598703926en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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