Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/317028 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 53 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Berlin Heidelberg [Place:] Berlin/Heidelberg [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 673-693
Publisher: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin/Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Abstract This paper provides a new characterization of belief consistency in extensive games. We show that all consistent assessments are supported by sequences of strategy profiles with the property that all actions with vanishing probability are played according to power functions of the sequence index. The result makes it simpler to prove or disprove that a given assessment is consistent, facilitating the use of sequential equilibria.
Subjects: 
Belief consistency
Sequential equilibria
Power sequences
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Additional Information: 
C72;C73
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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