Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316897 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11783
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
"Pendular Voting" presents a novel two-stage voting procedure: A randomly chosen citizen group votes on a proposal replacing the status quo. Depending on the outcome, a "counterproposal" ensues, that is closer to/further away from the status quo than the original proposal. All citizens vote pairwise on the status quo, initial proposal, and counterproposal (majority voting), the middle alternative being the default outcome in case of cyclical collective preferences. We analyze the process on a one-dimensional policy space, allowing for uncertainty about preference distribution. Manipulation may only occur in the first stage, without impacting the final outcome. Pendular Voting can engineer outcomes closer to the median voter's preferences than standard procedures, even with selfish agenda setters.
Schlagwörter: 
democracy
manipulation
information sharing
referendum.
JEL: 
C72
D70
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.