Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316766 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17811
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Direct evidence on variations in work incentives across different property rights systems remains scarce. This paper examines absenteeism among individuals employed in worker cooperatives—firms that are ultimately controlled by their workforce. By leveraging employment data matched with sick leave records and reform-induced variation in the generosity of Uruguay's statutory sick pay, we find that absenteeism differentially increased for individuals affected by the policy change and employed in cooperatives. The effect is driven by co-op members, hard-to-diagnose (and, hence, more prone to moral hazard reporting problems) musculoskeletal conditions and large cooperatives. Conventional firms used dismissals more intensely than cooperatives as a threat to keep absenteeism in check after the reform.
Subjects: 
property rights
cooperatives
sick pay
absenteeism
effort
teams
moral hazard
JEL: 
I18
J22
J54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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