Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31607
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dc.contributor.authorKregel, Janen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:09:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:09:25Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31607-
dc.description.abstractThis paper contrasts the economic incentives implicit in the Keynes-Minsky approach to inherent financial market instability with the incentives behind the traditional equilibrium approach leading to market stability to provide a framework for analyzing the stability induced by the recent changes in bank regulation to modernize financial services and the evolution of financial engineering innovations in the U.S. financial system. It suggests that the changes that have occurred in the profit incentives for bank holding companies have modified the provision of liquidity to the financial system by banks, and the way credit assessment has moved from banks to other actors in the system. It takes the current experience in financial instability created by the expansion, through securitization, of the mortgage market as an example of these changes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aLevy Economics Institute of Bard College |cAnnandale-on-Hudson, NYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // The Levy Economics Institute |x523en_US
dc.subject.jelG1en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG24en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFinancial Marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInstabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordMinskyen_US
dc.subject.keywordFinancial Fragilityen_US
dc.titleThe natural instability of financial marketsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn571722555en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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