Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31607 
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dc.contributor.authorKregel, Janen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:09:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:09:25Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31607-
dc.description.abstractThis paper contrasts the economic incentives implicit in the Keynes-Minsky approach to inherent financial market instability with the incentives behind the traditional equilibrium approach leading to market stability to provide a framework for analyzing the stability induced by the recent changes in bank regulation to modernize financial services and the evolution of financial engineering innovations in the U.S. financial system. It suggests that the changes that have occurred in the profit incentives for bank holding companies have modified the provision of liquidity to the financial system by banks, and the way credit assessment has moved from banks to other actors in the system. It takes the current experience in financial instability created by the expansion, through securitization, of the mortgage market as an example of these changes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aLevy Economics Institute of Bard College |cAnnandale-on-Hudson, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x523en
dc.subject.jelG1en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG24en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordFinancial Marketsen
dc.subject.keywordInstabilityen
dc.subject.keywordMinskyen
dc.subject.keywordFinancial Fragilityen
dc.titleThe natural instability of financial markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn571722555en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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