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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. WP 2025-05
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model of Ponzi schemes with asymmetric information to study Ponzi frauds. A long-lived agent offers to save on behalf of short-lived agents at a higher rate than they can earn themselves. The long-lived agent may genuinely have a superior savings technology, but may be an imposter trying to steal from short-lived agents. The model identifies when a Ponzi fraud can occur and what interventions can prevent it. A key feature of Ponzi frauds is that the long-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going.
Schlagwörter: 
Ponzi scheme
asymmetric information
reputation
fraud
JEL: 
C73
D82
G51
K42
L14
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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