Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315836 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economic Thought [ISSN:] 2049-3509 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 46-60
Publisher: 
World Economics Association, Bristol
Abstract: 
Friedrich Hayek was a fervent advocate of the methodological specificity of the social sciences. However, given his contact with Karl Popper, several historians and philosophers have characterised his final position as Popperian, that is, a position that would have accepted the unity of the scientific method. A closer look at Hayek's philosophy and Popper's own intellectual course shows that such a thesis is based on some misconceptions that can be overcome by taking the Hayekian concept of 'spontaneous order' as the foundation of a methodology immune to any kind of methodological monism, and focusing on Popper's late works that reveal a loosening of his defense of methodological unity.
Subjects: 
Hayek
Popper
spontaneous order
methodological monism
social sciences
JEL: 
B2
B3
B4
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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