Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315391 
Title (translated): 
Estrategias de precios aguas arriba, insumos múltiples y delegación aguas abajo
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 52 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 5-26
Publisher: 
Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, Santiago de Chile
Abstract: 
This paper considers a delegation game between one multi-input firm and one single-input firm engaging in Cournot competition in the downstream market. Both firms purchase a standard input from a core input supplier, and the multi-input firm also needs a supplementary input provided by an independent supplier. I study two input pricing policies of the core input supplier, uniform pricing and third-degree price discrimination, and obtain the following. First, regardless of the upstream pricing strategies, both downstream firms delegate in equilibrium, but contrary to traditional analysis, delegation is mutually profitable. Second, the core input supplier prefers uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination. Lastly, uniform pricing is more socially desirable than discriminatory pricing.
Subjects: 
Downstream delegation
multiple inputs
uniform vs discriminatory input pricing
JEL: 
L13
L21
M11
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.