Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315313 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade [ISSN:] 1573-7012 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 24 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
As dumping can harm industries by distorting competition, the World Trade Organization holds the option for its members to take anti-dumping measures. The European Union (EU) responds collectively to such threats and adjusts the supposedly dumped goods’ prices through tariffs back to their apparent “fair” value. Some critics argue though that the EU’s anti-dumping measures reduce economic efficiency and are actually protectionism in disguise. Our analysis of EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese iron and steel products points out that the “fair” value is indeed fair. Using the augmented synthetic control method, we show that the total EU import volume in the sanctioned product class remains constant, the import volume from China after introducing the tariff is significantly reduced, and the increase in total world import price is insignificant. Results thus suggest that supply from China is substituted through imports of countries outside the single market and that claims of protectionism are largely unfounded
Subjects: 
Anti-dumping
Synthetic control method
European Union
Protectionism
Steel
JEL: 
F13
F14
F53
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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