Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315061 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics [ISSN:] 1617-7134 [Volume:] 142 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer Vienna [Place:] Vienna [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 277-289
Verlag: 
Springer Vienna, Vienna
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that the implications of a merger on collusion sustainability change significantly from the extant literature if merger is not profitable in the punishment subgame where firms play non-cooperative Cournot–Nash game. Merger either does not affect collusion sustainability or it may decrease or increase collusion sustainability, depending on the output allocation for the merged firm. Our paper has the following implication for antitrust policies. If merger is observed, the authority will expect an industry-wide collusion, since merger will occur in our analysis provided it increases collusion sustainability.
Schlagwörter: 
Collusion
Cournot–Nash
Merger
JEL: 
D21
D43
D45
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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