Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315061 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics [ISSN:] 1617-7134 [Volume:] 142 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer Vienna [Place:] Vienna [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 277-289
Publisher: 
Springer Vienna, Vienna
Abstract: 
Abstract We show that the implications of a merger on collusion sustainability change significantly from the extant literature if merger is not profitable in the punishment subgame where firms play non-cooperative Cournot–Nash game. Merger either does not affect collusion sustainability or it may decrease or increase collusion sustainability, depending on the output allocation for the merged firm. Our paper has the following implication for antitrust policies. If merger is observed, the authority will expect an industry-wide collusion, since merger will occur in our analysis provided it increases collusion sustainability.
Subjects: 
Collusion
Cournot–Nash
Merger
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Additional Information: 
D21;D43;D45;L13
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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