Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315008 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2025/1
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
A real-world puzzle has eluded the attention of scholars and policymakers. Using unique data sets covering more than 8 million civil lawsuits in mainland China, Taiwan, and Japan, we observe that parties are often pro se even when high amounts of money are at stake. One (partial) explanation could be a "tipping point effect": parties are more inclined to be represented by an attorney if they expect the case to be a close call - and less inclined if they believe the odds of winning to be very high or very low. We support the tipping point effect in survey experiments framed as litigation. If the otherwise identical experiment is an unframed lottery, the effect disappears. Based on this evidence, we argue that the effect results from the combination of two behavioral effects: reference point dependence, and competitive spirit.
Schlagwörter: 
pro se
attorney representation
reference point dependence
the near miss effect
anticipated regret
framing
competitive spirit
JEL: 
C91
D86
D91
K41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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