Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315006 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2024/18
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 718 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. We find no robust age effects in the aggregate, but see that smaller group sizes and larger incentives increase the likelihood of choosing the efficient strategy. Beliefs play an important role as well, as subjects are more likely to play the efficient strategy when they expect others to do so as well. Our results are robust to controlling for individual risk-, time-, and social preferences.
Subjects: 
coordination game
age
group size
incentives
children
experiment
JEL: 
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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