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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Applied Economics [ISSN:] 1667-6726 [Volume:] 26 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 2279446 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-11
Verlag: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Zusammenfassung: 
Collective reputation, such as watches "made in Switzerland", affects the whole industry all over the world. This article highlights the relationship between competition and collective reputation. First, collective quality level depends on firms objectives. Second, the collectively determined quality of profit incentive firms reaches social optimal level. Finally, quality restriction is more efficient than subsidies to promote collective quality. The policy implication is that antitrust policy should not care about jointly determined quality for profit incentive firms. Further, cooperative innovation is encouraged to promote the collective reputation or cooperative innovation promotes the values of patents by collective reputation.
Schlagwörter: 
antitrust
Collective reputation
competition
social welfare
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