Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314183 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Applied Economics [ISSN:] 1667-6726 [Volume:] 25 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 731-740
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
An owner of a firm may choose to hire an unbiased CEO or one with confidence bias. We develop a model that demonstrates that the owner's optimal choice depends on whether the firm and rival choice variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. When choice variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements for both firms, owners optimize by hiring overconfident CEOs. When choice variables are substitutes for one firm and complements for the rival firm, each firm optimizes by hiring an underconfident CEO. We show that the model applies to price and output competition, advertising, research and development spending, and product design.
Subjects: 
Behavioral economics
confidence bias
firm behavior
managerial overconfidence
strategic substitutes and complements
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.