Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31386 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 06-30
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
As with other commodities, electricity is often traded on both forward and spot markets. This was initially true in the restructured California electricity ndustry from 1998 to 2000. Though the power traded in the forward and spot markets was for delivery at the same times and locations, prices often differed in significant and predictable ways. We consider several explanations for this apparent inefficiency, concluding that uncertainty about regulatory penalties for trading in the spot market caused most firms to avoid trading on inter-market price differences. The few firms that did carry out these trades did not find it profit-maximizing to eliminate the price differences. Skyrocketing prices in the summer of 2000, however, changed the major buyers’ (utilities’) incentives and increased the price differentials between the markets.
Dokumentart: 
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