Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31354 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 06-26
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that team-firms and individual firms are behaviorally equivalent. This provides a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition.
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D21
D23
D43
L13
L22
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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