Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31324 
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dc.contributor.authorPrieger, James E.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-04-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:03:57Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:03:57Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31324-
dc.description.abstractThis paper endogenizes the interplay between innovation by a regulated firm and regulatory delay. When product innovation costs fall over time, an extra day of regulatory delay increases time to introduction by more than a day. In the signaling model, the firm therefore times its innovation to communicate its private information about the marginal cost of delay to the regulator. Successful signaling leads the regulator to reduce regulatory delay. The model places testable restrictions on the empirical relationship between innovation delay and regulatory delay. The model is consistent with data gathered from a large U.S. telecommunications provider.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Department of Economics |cDavis, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x05-4en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelL96en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwInnovationen
dc.subject.stwZeiten
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEndogeneous regulatory delay and the timing of product innovation-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn505100789en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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