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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Homo Oeconomicus [ISSN:] 2366-6161 [Volume:] 39 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer International Publishing [Place:] Cham [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 25-35
Verlag: 
Springer International Publishing, Cham
Zusammenfassung: 
For Hans Albert, what is to be deemed morally right or wrong could either be based on human conventions (decisions) or on findings of facts (cognitions). As an ethical non-cognitivist Albert emphasizes that decision-based conventions are constitutive of 'morals/ethics'. Yet, it has been claimed that Popper's falsificationism applies to prescriptive moral theories roughly as it does to descriptive empirical theories and that this analogy justifies a variant of ethical cognitivism. It is argued in this paper, that such ethical cognitivism would require beyond empirical and analytical fact-finding other abilities of moral cognition which are to be rejected within Albert's critical rationalism and realism.
Schlagwörter: 
Albert
Popper
Critical rationalism
Metaethics
Ethical cognitivism
JEL: 
A12
B40
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Published Version

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