Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313104 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 354
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
Public disclosure laws on politicians' outside income aim to enhance electoral accountability, but their effects remain unclear and may backfire. Using a German disclosure reform, administrative tax data, and a difference-in-difference design, we show that MPs increased their outside income after public disclosure. We find suggestive evidence that the effect is driven by right-leaning MPs. A survey among voters shows that perceptions of outside income differ by party alignment: right-leaning voters view it as a sign of competence, while left-leaning voters associate it with weaker voter representation. These findings highlight the complex interplay between transparency, voter perception, and political behavior.
Subjects: 
tax data
outside income
politicians
income disclosure
JEL: 
D72
D83
J45
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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