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dc.contributor.authorNeyman, Abrahamen
dc.contributor.authorOkada, Daijiroen
dc.date.accessioned2006-03-08-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:02:16Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:02:16Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298-
dc.description.abstractThis paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2005-14en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBounded Rationalityen
dc.subject.keywordStrategy Set Growthen
dc.subject.keywordStrategic Complexityen
dc.subject.keywordNonstationary Bounded Recallen
dc.subject.keywordRepeated Gamesen
dc.subject.keywordEntropyen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten
dc.subject.stwZeiten
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.subject.stwEntropieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleGrowth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn508623774en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:200514en

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