Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298
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dc.contributor.authorNeyman, Abrahamen_US
dc.contributor.authorOkada, Daijiroen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-03-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:02:16Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:02:16Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298-
dc.description.abstractThis paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey |cNew Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |x2005,14en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBounded Rationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrategy Set Growthen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrategic Complexityen_US
dc.subject.keywordNonstationary Bounded Recallen_US
dc.subject.keywordRepeated Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordEntropyen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwZeiten_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwEntropieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGrowth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recallen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn508623774en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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