Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312917 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 701
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
We propose and axiomatize a new model of incomplete preferences under uncertainty, which we call hope-and-prepare preferences. An act is considered more desirable than another when, and only when, both an optimistic evaluation, computed as the welfare level attained in a best-case scenario, and a pessimistic one, computed as the welfare level attained in a worst-case scenario, rank the former above the latter. Our comparison criterion involves multiple priors, as best and worst cases are determined among sets of probability distributions. We make the case that, compared to existing incomplete criteria under ambiguity, hope-and-prepare preferences address the trade-off between conviction and decisiveness in a new way, which is more favorable to decisiveness.
Subjects: 
Decision theory
Incomplete preference
Multiple-selves
Non-obvious manipulability
JEL: 
D01
D81
D90
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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