Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31290 
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dc.contributor.authorCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriolen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-23-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:02:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:02:11Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31290-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to nonlinear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional. Second, the Nash set can be characterized generically, and its components give sharp predictions. Third, the features of equilibrium tax policies depend only on empirically meaningful fundamentals. Equilibrium tax schedules benefit the more numerous income groups and place the burden of taxation on income groups with fewer voters. For empirical income distributions, the features of an equilibrium tax schedule are reminiscent of Director's law of public income redistribution (Stigler [36]).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2007-06en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelH31en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNonlinear income taxationen
dc.subject.keywordelectoral competitionhen
dc.subject.keywordDirector's lawen
dc.subject.keywordextensive zero-sum gameen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuerpolitiken
dc.subject.stwSteuertheorieen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Modellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA positive theory of income taxation-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn568265793en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:200706en

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