Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312880 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 24-11
Publisher: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Abstract: 
A researcher allocates a budget of informative tests across multiple unknown attributes to influence a decision-maker. We derive the researcher's equilibrium learning strategy by solving an auxiliary single-player problem. The attribute weights in this problem depend on how much the researcher and the decision-maker disagree. If the researcher expects an excessive response to new information, she forgoes learning altogether. In an organizational context, we show that a manager favors more diverse analysts as the hierarchical distance grows. In another application, we show how an appropriately opposed advisor can constrain a discriminatory politician, and identify the welfare-inequality Pareto frontier of researchers.
Subjects: 
Attributes
Information acquisition
Gaussian distribution
Strategic learning
JEL: 
D72
D81
D83
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.