Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31263
Authors: 
Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2006,29
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.
Subjects: 
Foreign aid
rent seeking
governance
decentralization
JEL: 
O10
O19
F35
O11
C23
O47
E21
E22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.