Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312569 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 24-081
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best information acquisition and allocation rule. We apply our results to a commonly used model of auctions with information acquisition. The bidders are symmetric and information acquisition costs are moderate. Our analysis shows that the Dutch auction achieves near-eciency. That is, the welfare loss is bounded by the information acquisition cost of a single bidder. In contrast, the English auction may result in greater welfare losses.
Schlagwörter: 
Information acquisition
dynamic auctions
dynamic pivot mechanism
JEL: 
D44
D82
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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