Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31250
Authors: 
Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1454
Abstract: 
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders.valuations. We analyze how the ability to .jump-bid,. or raise bids by more than the minimal necessary increment aþects the outcome of the auction. We also study the impact of budget caps on total bids. We show that both of these features, which are common in practice but absent from the previous literature, matter signi.cantly in determining the outcome of the auctions.
Subjects: 
All-Pay auctions
jump-bidding
auctions
war of attrition.
JEL: 
C62
C63
C72
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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