Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31248
Authors: 
Diermeier, Daniel
Fong, Pohan
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1466
Abstract: 
Diermeier and Fong (2008a) recently proposed a legislative bargaining model with reconsideration in the context of a distributive policy environment. In this paper we prove general existence and necessary conditions for pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space and preference profile. We also provide an algorithm to compute these equilibria. In any such equilibrium proposal power is endogenously limited compared to the case of no reconsideration. The general model is then applied to various policy environments, including a model with spatial preferences. In the context of a public goods environment we can show that lack of commitment increases policy efficiency.
Subjects: 
Legislative bargaining
reconsideration
evolving default
proposal power
lack of commitment
distributive politics
public goods
spatial model
JEL: 
C72
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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