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dc.contributor.authorShneyerov, Artyomen
dc.contributor.authorWong, Adam Chi Leungen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:09Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:09Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31237-
dc.description.abstractWe study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. We first consider generalized random-proposer take-it-or-leave-it offer games (GRP TIOLI games). This class of games includes a simple random-proposer TIOLI game, but also many other interesting bargaining games. A friction parameter is t , the length of the time period until the next meeting. We find that as t - O, all market equilibria converge to the Walrasian limit, at the fastest possible rate O(t) among all bargaining mechanisms. Some important bargaining games not in this class may have non-convergent market equilibria. This is the case for the k-double auction: we find that there are equilibria that converge at a linear rate, those that converge at a slower rate or even not converge at all.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1467en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMatching and bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordsearchen
dc.subject.keyworddouble auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordfoundations for perfect competitionen
dc.subject.keywordrate of convergenceen
dc.titleThe rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587666633en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1467en

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