Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31237
Authors: 
Shneyerov, Artyom
Wong, Adam Chi Leung
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1467
Abstract: 
We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. We first consider generalized random-proposer take-it-or-leave-it offer games (GRP TIOLI games). This class of games includes a simple random-proposer TIOLI game, but also many other interesting bargaining games. A friction parameter is t , the length of the time period until the next meeting. We find that as t - O, all market equilibria converge to the Walrasian limit, at the fastest possible rate O(t) among all bargaining mechanisms. Some important bargaining games not in this class may have non-convergent market equilibria. This is the case for the k-double auction: we find that there are equilibria that converge at a linear rate, those that converge at a slower rate or even not converge at all.
Subjects: 
Matching and bargaining
search
double auctions
foundations for perfect competition
rate of convergence
JEL: 
C73
C78
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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