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dc.contributor.authorCalzolari, Giacomoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPavan, Alessandroen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|x1404en_US
dc.subject.keywordcontractual and informational externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal disclosure policiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsequential common agency gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordexogenous and endogenous private informationen_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.titleOn the optimality of rivacy in sequential contractingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

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