Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31224 
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dc.contributor.authorCalzolari, Giacomoen
dc.contributor.authorPavan, Alessandroen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:00Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31224-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1404en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelL1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcontractual and informational externalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal disclosure policiesen
dc.subject.keywordsequential common agency gamesen
dc.subject.keywordexogenous and endogenous private informationen
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the optimality of rivacy in sequential contracting-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587316012en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1404en

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