Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31222 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1439
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs (computational or otherwise) for each strategy. First we connect this to zero-sum games, proving a counter-intuitive generalization of the classic min-max theorem to zero-sum games with the addition of strategy costs. We then show that potential games with strategy costs remain potential games. Both zero-sum and potential games with strategy costs maintain a very appealing property: simple learning dynamics converge to equilibrium.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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