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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11602
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We conducted a lab experiment to examine (1) whether luck-based income influences honesty in a subsequent, unrelated decision, (2) whether the perceived agency over an uncertain event affects the interplay between luck and honesty, and (3) whether accumulated previous luck-based incomes influence honesty. Specifically, participants self-report a dice roll outcome after receiving an unrelated luck-based income. Additionally, we manipulated participants' perceived control over the luck-based income. In the exogenous luck treatment, computerized coin tosses determine the luck-based income. In the endogenous luck treatment, computerized coin tosses also determine the luck-based income, but the participants choose the coin's winning side beforehand. Our main findings are as follows: lying behavior increases when contemporaneous luck-based income is high, remains unaffected by perceived agency, and does not correlate with prior luck-based income. Furthermore, we find evidence suggesting that individual-specific heterogeneity may significantly influence dishonesty, contrasting with the common view that context is the primary driver.
Schlagwörter: 
laboratory experiment
lying
luck
honesty
agency
JEL: 
C91
D03
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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