Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31211
Authors: 
Gossner, Olivier
Hörner, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1440
Abstract: 
We study the relationship between a player's (stage game) minmax payoff and the individually rational payoff in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under a full rank assumption, we further show that, if the monitoring structure of an infinitely repeated game 'nearly' satisfies this condition, then these two payoffs are approximately equal, independently of the discount factor. This provides conditions under which existing folk theorems exactly characterize the limiting payoff set.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
226.38 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.