Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31205
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dc.contributor.authorPai, Malleshen_US
dc.contributor.authorVohra, Rakesh V.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31205-
dc.description.abstractWe consider an environment where potential buyers of an indivisible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive constrained-e±cient and revenue maximizing auctions for this setting. In general, the optimal auction requires `pooling' both at the top and in the middle despite the maintained assumption of a monotone hazard rate. Further, the auctioneer will never ¯nd it desirable to subsidize bidders with low budgets.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|x1471en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordbudget constraintsen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwBudgetrestriktionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal auctions with financially constrained biddersen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587667141en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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