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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1471
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indivisible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive constrained-e±cient and revenue maximizing auctions for this setting. In general, the optimal auction requires `pooling' both at the top and in the middle despite the maintained assumption of a monotone hazard rate. Further, the auctioneer will never ¯nd it desirable to subsidize bidders with low budgets.
Schlagwörter: 
optimal auction
budget constraints
JEL: 
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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