Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31201 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1438
Publisher: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Abstract: 
We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suþer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this eþect to their interest.
Subjects: 
Network
voting
cross-cutting
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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