Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31201 
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dc.contributor.authorAndina-Díaz, Ascensiónen
dc.contributor.authorMeléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31201-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suþer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this eþect to their interest.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1438en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNetworken
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordcross-cuttingen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Verhaltenen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleVoting in small networks with cross-pressure-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587537302en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1438en

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