Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31198 
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dc.contributor.authorHörner, Johannesen
dc.contributor.authorJamison, Julianen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:34Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31198-
dc.description.abstractWe study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es-sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players.payoþs tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re.nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not aþect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of .collusion without conspiracy.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1422en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordrepeated game with incomplete informationen
dc.subject.keywordprivate informationen
dc.subject.keywordratchet effecten
dc.subject.keywordfirst-price auctionen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic auctionsen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePrivate Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587471956en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1422en

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