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dc.contributor.authorHörner, Johannesen_US
dc.contributor.authorJamison, Julianen_US
dc.description.abstractWe study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es-sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players.payoþs tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re.nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not aþect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of .collusion without conspiracy.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science|x1422en_US
dc.subject.keywordrepeated game with incomplete informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordratchet effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordfirst-price auctionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic auctionsen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.titlePrivate Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctionsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

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