Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311868 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Economics [ISSN:] 1861-8928 [Volume:] 94 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 525-541
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
The new Digital Market Act (DMA) of the European Union imposes stricter rules on gatekeeper platforms. While this affects only a few very large platforms, the discussion surrounding the implementation of the DMA offers valuable insights into the strategic behaviors of those gatekeeper platforms. A gatekeeper platform, for example, may enter its platform as a supplier, which may hurt existing third-party suppliers and restrict fair competition on the platform. This paper flips the academic discussion on whether marketplace owners should be allowed to sell on their marketplaces. It illustrates why this behavior is profitable for gatekeepers and how marketplace owners can apply this knowledge to improve their business models. The paper identifies five situations in which becoming a supplier in one's marketplace can be profitable, but it also proposes alternative solutions to entering the market.
Schlagwörter: 
Digital platforms
Digital Market Act
Self-preferencing
Market-entry
Marketplaces
JEL: 
M21
M30
M13
L26
L15
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.