Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176 
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dc.contributor.authorCalzolari, Giacomoen
dc.contributor.authorPavan, Alessandroen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:18:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:18:11Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1405en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinformation linkage between primary and secondary marketsen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal disclosure policyen
dc.subject.keywordstochastic allocationsen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism design.en
dc.subject.stwMonopolen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMonopoly with resale-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn586193200en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1405en

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