Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31175
Authors: 
Pai, Mallesh
Vohra, Rakesh V.
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1461
Abstract: 
We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for a unit as well as the time by which she must make the purchase are private information. In this environment, we derive the revenue maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible selling mechanism.
Subjects: 
dynamic mechanism design
optimal auctions
virtual valuation
revelation principle
JEL: 
D44
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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