Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31170
Authors: 
Dahm, Matthias
Porteiro, Nicolás
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1409
Abstract: 
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide verifiable policy-relevant information to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. We show that both lobbying instruments are interdependent. In our view information provision is a risky attempt to affect the politician's beliefs about the desirability of the lobby's objective. The constraints governing informational lobbying determine a specific lottery available. The circumstances under which political pressure can be applied specify the lobby's valuation of different beliefs of the politician and, thus, her attitude toward risk. The combination of lotteries available and induced risk preference determines the optimal lobbying behavior. Our approach gives a novel explanation for the fact that interest groups often try to provide information credibly. We identify several factors that induce risk proclivity (and thus information provision). We also show that the availability of political pressure might have a deterrence effect on information provision. This 'shadow of political pressure' might impede information provision at all or induce a complementary relationship between both lobbying instruments.
Subjects: 
Experts
Influence
Credibility
Political contributions
Issue ads
JEL: 
C72
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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