Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311236 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 1573-6938 [Volume:] 26 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 622-645
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly reported rank. Subjects who care about social image and experience a decline in rank lie more than those experiencing gains. Moreover, we document a discontinuity in lying behavior when moving from rank losses to gains. Our results are in line with loss aversion in social image concerns.
Schlagwörter: 
Loss aversion
Social image concerns
Lying behavior
Laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C91
D91
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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